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Abstract
Secret sharing is an important concept for implementing robust and secure computer systems.
A (t; ‘)-threshold scheme such as Shamir’s (Commun. ACM22(11) (1979) 612{613) is a mech-
anism that allows a set of ‘ participants to share a secret such that only subsets of t or more
participants can reconstruct it. The threshold scheme, though simple and easy to implement, is
not exible enough to support complex secret sharing policies typical in practical systems. An
access structure (Benaloh and Leichter, Advances in Cryptology { CRYPTO’88, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 403, Springer, Berlin, 1990, pp. 27{35; Ito et al., Globecom’87, Tokyo,
Japan, 1987, pp. 99{102), on the other hand, is a powerful concept by which complex secret
sharing schemes may be represented. However, the implementation is very complicated when
the access structure contains a great number of authorized sets. This paper introduces a new
construction for the secret sharing schemes called threshold closure, which allows a complex
access structure it represents to be realized by possibly the fewest number of (t; ‘)-threshold
schemes. c© 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: The Shamir threshold scheme; Secret sharing scheme; Access structure;
Threshold closure; Scalability
1. Introduction
In 1979, Blakley [3] and Shamir [13] independently devised shared secret schemes
for the same application: robust key management for cryptosystems. They were con-
cerned both with the problem of legitimate users being locked out of the system, that
is, the key being lost for some reasons, and of unauthorized users getting in. Given
a cryptographic key, that is, the secret piece of information, one wishes to construct
‘ related pieces of information with the property that any subset of t of these pieces
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will suce to recover the original secret, but such that no subset of t − 1 or fewer
of them will reveal it. Given such a construction, the pieces of information can then
be distributed securely to the ‘ participants in the secret sharing scheme, which is
called a (t; ‘)-threshold scheme. Thereafter, as many as ‘ − t of the private pieces
of the information could be lost or unavailable when needed and the key could still
be reconstructed. Furthermore, no security breach of fewer than t of the pieces could
reveal the key to an unauthorized user.
The threshold scheme is attractive in that it is easy to implement. One only needs
to compute, for example, a polynomial interpolation in the Shamir threshold scheme. 1
However, due to its simple secret sharing structure, the application area of the thresh-
old scheme is limited. It is not applicable to the situation which requires that some
combinations of more than t participants are able to reconstruct the secret, while the
other combinations of less than t participants can also reconstruct the secret. Another
disadvantage of the threshold scheme is presented in [1]. If the secret key is disclosed,
then the threshold scheme can hardly discriminate the conspiratorial participants even
it is convinced that one participant has \a watertight alibi".
A more general situation is to specify exactly which subsets of participants should
be able to determine the secret and which should not. Under these circumstances,
the concept of access structure for representing complex secret sharing schemes was
proposed [10, 2]. A secret sharing scheme based on the access structure is a mechanism
by which a secret can be protected among a group of participants. In fact, the access
structure is composed by a number of authorized sets and unauthorized sets, and each
participant holds a private share of the secret. Only the participants from an authorized
set are able to reconstruct the secret from their respective pooled shares. Further, the
participants from an unauthorized set are not able to reconstruct the secret from their
respective pooled shares. So the access structure is more exible and can represent
more complex secret sharing schemes. In addition, by means of access structure, the
conspiratorial participants can be more easily detected as illustrated in [1].
However, if there are a lot of various authorized sets in an access structure, then
constructing a secret sharing scheme to realize this access structure will become very
complicated. As a result, a lot of secret sharing schemes are devised to simplify the
realization of the access structure, and they are being applied in a lot of areas such as
access control, voting system, missile system, multisignature system, and key manage-
ment and key distribution systems.
In 1987, Ito et al. [10] gave a construction which shows that there exists a perfect
secret sharing scheme realizing any monotone access structure. Benaloh and Leichter
[2] later proposed a conceptually simple and elegant proof of this result. The idea is
to build a monotone boolean circuit that recognizes the access structure, and then to
construct the secret sharing scheme from the description of the circuit. The circuit is
composed by an or gate and a certain number of and gates. Each and gate represents
an authorized set and is implemented by a (t; t)-threshold scheme which is only a
1 The details of the Shamir threshold scheme are described in Section 2.1.
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special case of (t; ‘)-threshold scheme. Because the number of (t; t)-threshold schemes
implementing the authorized sets in the access structure is just equal to the number
of these authorized sets, the monotone circuit construction cannot actually simplify the
realization of the access structure.
In 1989, Brickell [6] presented another construction method named vector space
construction. This construction requires that the dealer and the participants have their
own vectors, and a set of participants is an authorized set if and only if the dealer’s
vector can be expressed as a linear combination of the vectors of the set of participants.
With this property the vector space construction can realize not only the threshold
access structures 2 but also the access structure based on a complete multipartite graph
and other more complex access structures.
After generalizing the Blakley threshold scheme [3], Simmons [14{16] described the
geometric construction in much more further steps. The main point of the geometric
construction is: when a subset of participants wishes to compute the secret, they will
compute the span of the shares they collectively hold, and intersect it with the key set.
If the intersection is nonempty, then the unique point of intersection is the secret key.
More recently, Stinson built the decomposition construction [17] which is a recursive
construction. Its main objective is to decompose an access structure into several sub-
access structures which can be realized by ideal schemes.
Anonymous secret sharing schemes were rst investigated in 1988 by Stinson and
Vanstone [19] and developed by Blundo and Stinson [5] in 1996. In an anonymous
secret sharing scheme the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of which
participants hold which shares. The constructions for the anonymous secret sharing
schemes can be applied to the access structures obtained from complete multipartite
graphs.
The concept of nonlinear secret sharing was proposed in 1996 by Renvall and Ding
[11]. It is aimed to make up for the diculty of nding more MDS linear codes, and
therefore more linear (t; ‘)-threshold schemes. The nonlinear secret sharing scheme is
based on quadratic forms and the computation of both the shares and the secret is easy.
For a good introduction to the theory of secret sharing schemes, the reader is referred
to [17]. As to their detailed applications please see [7, 8, 15]. Besides, the up-to-date
on-line bibliography maintained by Stinson [18] is also strongly recommended.
This paper introduces a new construction for the secret sharing schemes called thresh-
old closure, which allows a complex access structure it represents to be realized by
possibly the fewest number of (t; ‘)-threshold schemes. In fact, the threshold closure
of an access structure is a minimal collection of thresholds derived from that access
structure such that it can be used to implement the underlying secret sharing scheme.
Moreover, the threshold closure is assigned a series of operations to maintain its con-
sistency with the practically mutable access structure, which embodies the scalability
of the threshold closure.
2 A kind of access structures realized by the threshold scheme.
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This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we review two basic approaches
to secret sharing schemes { the Shamir threshold scheme and the access structure.
Section 3 gives rise to the concept of threshold closure which is later carefully dis-
cussed in Section 4. At last, Section 5 concludes the results of this paper.
2. Basic approaches to secret sharing schemes
2.1. The Shamir threshold scheme
In the Shamir (t; ‘)-threshold scheme [13], the dealer is responsible for privately
choosing a random polynomial f(x) of degree t − 1 over a eld such that the se-
cret key K is f(0). Let P denote the complete nite set of all participants, where
P= fP1; : : : ; Pwg. Then the dealer selects a subset S P (jSj= ‘>t), and gives each
participant Pi in S a secret share Ki=f(xi), where xi 6=0 and xi 6= xj for i 6= j. Any
subset A S of t shareholders are sucient to work together to regenerate the secret
by the Lagrange interpolation formula
f(0) =
P
Pi2A
Ki  yi;A; (1)
where
yi;A =
Q
Pj2A; j 6= i
0− xj
xi − xj : (2)
However, no group of t − 1 participants can do so.
The Shamir threshold scheme is very attractive because it only needs to compute
a very simple Lagrange interpolation formula. However, the application area of the
Shamir threshold scheme is limited. In a practical information system, a complex se-
cret sharing scheme is preferred and is expected to change dynamically to reect the
current trust status of each participant. However the Shamir threshold scheme lacks
this dynamic property. It cannot deal with such a situation as some combinations of
more than t participants are allowed to reconstruct the secret key, while, at the same
time, the other combinations of less than t participants are also permitted to do so.
2.2. Access structure and general secret sharing
An access structure is used to specify which subsets of participants should be able to
determine the secret and which should not. A general secret sharing scheme based on
the access structure is a mechanism by which a secret can be protected among a group
of participants. In fact, the access structure is composed by a number of authorized
sets and unauthorized sets, and each participant holds a private share of the secret.
Only the participants from an authorized set are able to reconstruct the secret from
their respective pooled shares. Further, the participants from an unauthorized set are
not able to reconstruct the secret from their respective pooled shares. So the access
structure is more exible and can represent more complex secret sharing schemes.
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Now, we use more formalized denitions to explain the access structure [17].
The collections of authorized sets   and unauthorized sets , assumed to be disjoint,
are called the access structure ( ; ) of the secret sharing scheme. Further, if every
subset of participants belongs to either   or  then ( ; ) is called complete and is
denoted by  , i.e.,
 [ = 2P;   \  = ;:
Denition 2.1. Let P= fP1; : : : ; Pwg be a nite set of w participants. A monotone
access structure   on P is a subset   2P, such that
A2 ; AA0P)A0 2 :
Through this paper we assume that every access structure is complete and monotone.
Denition 2.2. Let P= fP1; : : : ; Pwg be a nite set of w participants and let A 2P.
The closure of A, denoted as (A), is the set
(A) = fC: 9B2A such that BC Pg:
For a monotone access structure   we have  = ( ). If   is an access structure
on P, then B2  is a minimal qualied set if A =2   whenever AB; A 6= B. The
family of minimal qualied sets of   is denoted as  0 and is called the basis of  .
We refer to a minimal qualied set as a basis set. It is easy to see that   is uniquely
determined as a function of  0, namely,  = ( 0).
Clearly, the general secret sharing scheme based on the access structure can com-
pletely reect the real and dynamic status of all participants. But if an access structure
contains a lot of various authorized sets, then obviously it would become very com-
plicated to construct a secret sharing scheme to realize this access structure.
3. Motivation
Suppose there are ve participants, say, P1; P2; P3; P4 and P5. Originally, the dealer
decides that every two out of ve participants can recover the key, so totally 10
authorized subsets form a threshold access structure
fP1P2; P1P3; P1P4; P1P5; P2P3; P2P4; P2P5; P3P4; P3P5; P4P5g:
Clearly one (2; 5)-threshold scheme can realize the above access structure, namely
T =(2; P1P2P3P4P5):
After a period of time the dealer suspects or detects that P1 and P2 conspiratorially
act something invalid together, so he decides to discard the subset P1P2 from the
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threshold access structure for the reason of security. Then the resulting access structure
is changed to
fP1P3; P1P4; P1P5; P2P3; P2P4; P2P5; P3P4; P3P5; P4P5g:
Apparently, two threshold schemes are sucient to realize the access structure, they
are
T1 = (2; P1P3P4P5); T2 = (2; P2P3P4P5):
Possibly after another period of time, the dealer again wants to discard the subset P3P4
from the access structure. Then the access structure would become
fP1P3; P1P4; P1P5; P2P3; P2P4; P2P5; P3P5; P4P5g:
The above access structure can be realized by four threshold schemes
T3 = (2; P1P3P5); T4 = (2; P1P4P5); T5 = (2; P2P3P5); T6 = (2; P2P4P5):
If we observe the threshold schemes realizing the above access structures, we can see
that there are some duplication among them. For example, T1 and T2 have the same
part P3P4P5, while T3 and T4 have the same part P1P5. This property of duplication
guarantees the availability of the shares. For example, if the shares of P3; P4 and P5
in T1 are lost for some unexpected reasons, then we can still recover the key by using
their shares in T2.
More importantly, if an access structure has enough many authorized sets, then the
number of threshold schemes suciently realizing the access structure can be very
much smaller than the number of the authorized sets in the access structure. Inspired
by this idea, we focus our study on how to nd a minimal collection of threshold
schemes to realize the access structure. We call such a collection a threshold closure.
4. Threshold closure
4.1. Properties of threshold closure
Notation 4.1. [S]t = fS 0: jS 0j= t; S 0 Sg.
Lemma 4.1. S0 S , S0 2 [S]jS0j.
Denition 4.1. A threshold closure, denoted as , is a collection of (t; S)-threshold
schemes (0< t6jSj; S P), and satises the following three conditions:
(1) It is redundant-free, i.e., there do not exist two distinct (t1; S1); (t2; S2)2 , such
that
S1 S2
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or
jS1 \ S2j>minft1; t2g; t1 6= t2:
(2) It is reduced, i.e., there do not exist (t; S1); (t; S2); : : : ; (t; Sm)2  such that
mS
i=1
[Si]t =

mS
i=1
Si

t
:
(3) It is closed, i.e., 8(t; S1); (t; S2); : : : ; (t; Sm)2  and S 01 S1; S 02 S2; : : : ; S 0m Sm
(\= " cannot be held by all), if
mS
i=1
[S 0i ]t =

mS
i=1
S 0i

t
;
then
 (t; Smi=1 S 0i ) 2 , or
 (t; Smi=1 S 0i ) =2 , and (9(t; S) 2 ) Smi=1 S 0i  S.
Lemma 4.2. Given a threshold closure  and a threshold (t0; S0); if
[S0]t0 
S
(t; S)2
[S]t ;
then (9(t0; S) 2 ) S0 S.
Proof. Because [S0]t0 
S
(t; S)2 [S]t , we can decide that 9(t0; S1); (t0; S2); : : : ; (t0; Sm)2 
and S 01 S1; S 02 S2; : : : ; S 0m Sm (\= " cannot be held by all) such that
mS
i=1
[S 0i ]t0 =

mS
i=1
S 0i

t0
and
mS
i=1
S 0i = S0:
Note that here \= " cannot be held by all, otherwise  would not satisfy the 2nd
condition of Denition 4.1, hence is not actually a threshold closure.
So by the 3rd condition of Denition 4.1, we have
(1) (t0; S0) 2 , or
(2) (t0; S0) =2 , and (9(t0; S) 2 ) S0 S.
In short, we can conclude that (9(t0; S) 2 ) S0 S.
Theorem 4.1. Given two threshold closures 1 and 2; if 1 6= 2; thenS
(t; S)21
[S]t 6=
S
(t; S)22
[S]t :
Proof. Otherwise, we assume that
1 6= 2 and
S
(t; S)21
[S]t =
S
(t; S)22
[S]t : (3)
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From 1 6= 2, we can get
(9(t1; S1) 2 1)(t1; S1) =2 2
or
(9(t2; S2) 2 2)(t2; S2) =2 1:
Without loss of generality, we suppose that
(9(t1; S1) 2 1)(t1; S1) =2 2: (4)
From (t1; S1) 2 1, we can get
[S1]t1 
S
(t; S)21
[S]t ;
so by Eq. (3)
[S1]t1 
S
(t; S)22
[S]t :
From Lemma 4.2, we can get
(9(t1; S 01) 2 2) S1 S 01 (S1 6= S 01 because (t1; S1) =2 2): (5)
Clearly,
[S 01]t1 
S
(t; S)22
[S]t ;
so by Eq. (3)
[S 01]t1 
S
(t; S)21
[S]t :
Again by Lemma 4.2, we have
(9(t1; S 001 ) 2 1) S 01 S 001 : (6)
By Eqs. (5) and (6) we get
S1 S 001 ;
which is contradictory to the 1st condition of Denition 4.1 because (t1; S1) 2 1 and
also (t1; S 001 ) 2 1 by Eqs. (4) and (6).
4.2. Consistency between  0 and 
From Section 3 we see that each access structure can be realized by a collection of
threshold schemes. We elaborate the detailed implementation process here.
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Denition 4.2. An access structure  0 and a threshold closure  are said to be consis-
tent with each other i
S
(t; S)2
[S]t = 0: (7)
In this case, this consistency is denoted as  0   or    0.
Obviously if  0  , then  0 can be realized by all of the threshold schemes in .
From Eq. (7) we can infer two corollaries:
Corollary 4.1. (8(t; S)2 ) [S]t  0 (,
S
(t; S)2[S]t  0).
Corollary 4.2. (8S 2 0) (9(jSj; S 0)2 ) S 2 [S 0]jSj (, 0
S
(t; S)2[S]t).
Hence, Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 can be used to prove that  0  .
Dene
(t1; S) 4 (t2; T ) i t1 = t2 and S T; (8)
= f(t; S) : [S]t  0g; (9)
= f(t; S)2 : ( 6 9(t; S 0)2 ) S  S 0g; (10)
so obviously  , and  6= ; if  6= ;.
In addition, 4 is a partial order on , i.e., for every (t; S); (t; T ); (t; U ) 2 ,
(1) (t; S) 4 (t; S);
(2) (t; S) 4 (t; T ) and (t; T ) 4 (t; S) imply (t; S)= (t; T );
(3) (t; S) 4 (t; T ) and (t; T ) 4 (t; U ) imply (t; S) 4 (t; U ).
Therefore, the pair (;4) is a partially ordered set or poset. From the relation between
 and , we can also see that  is the collection of all of the maximal elements of .
By Hasse diagram of the poset, it is not dicult to get the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. If   6= ;; then (8(t; S 0)2  − ) (9(t; S)2 ) S 0 S.
In the next two theorems, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the consistency
between  0 and .
Theorem 4.2. Given a basis access structure  0; there is one and only one threshold
closure  consistent with it.
Proof. First, we prove that  in Eq. (10) is a threshold closure.
(1)  is a collection of (t; S)-threshold schemes,
(2)  is redundant-free, i.e., there do not exist two distinct (t1; S1), (t2; S2)2 , such
that S1 S2 or jS1 \ S2j>minft1; t2g (t1 6= t2).
If we assume that
(9(t1; S1); (t2; S2)2 ) t1 = t2 ^ S1 S2;
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then by Eq. (10) and t1 = t2 ^ S1 S2 ^ (t2; S2)2 , (t1; S1) can not be in , so this is
a contradiction.
If we assume that
(9(t1; S1); (t2; S2)2 ) t1 6= t2 ^ (S1 S2 _ jS1 \ S2j>minft1; t2g);
then denitely
(9S 01 2 [S1]t1 ; S 02 2 [S2]t2 ) S 01 S 02 _ S 01 S 02: (11)
From (t1; S1); (t2; S2)2  and  , we can get
(t1; S1); (t2; S2)2 ;
so by Eq (9) we have
[S1]t1 ; [S2]t2  0: (12)
Combination of Eqs. (11) and (12) gives
S 01; S
0
2 2 0;
thus by the property of  0
S 01 6 S 02 ^ S 01 6 S 02: (13)
Obviously, Eq. (13) is in contradiction with Eq. (11).
(3)  is reduced, i.e., there do not exist (t; S1); (t; S2); : : : ; (t; Sm)2  such that
mS
i=1
[Si]t =

mS
i=1
Si

t
:
Otherwise we assume 9(t; S1); (t; S2); : : : ; (t; Sm)2  such that
mS
i=1
[Si]t =

mS
i=1
Si

t
: (14)
Clearly (t; S1); (t; S2); : : : ; (t; Sm)2 , so
[S1]t  0; [S2]t  0; : : : ; [Sm]t  0;
i.e.,
mS
i=1
[Si]t  0: (15)
Combination of Eqs. (14) and (15) gets
mS
i=1
Si

t
 0;
so by Eq. (9)
t;
mS
i=1
Si

2 : (16)
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Because it is obvious that
S1
mS
i=1
Si; : : : ; Sm
mS
i=1
Si;
so by Eqs. (10) and (16), (t; S1) =2 ; : : : ; (t; Sm) =2 , which is a contradiction.
(4)  is closed, i.e., 8(t; S1); (t; S2); : : : ; (t; Sm)2  and S 01 S1; S 02 S2; : : : ; S 0m Sm
(\ = " cannot be held by all), if
mS
i=1
[S 0i ]t =

mS
i=1
S 0i

t
;
then
 (t; Smi=1 S 0i )2 , or
 (t; Smi=1 S 0i ) =2 , and (9(t; S)2 ) Smi=1 S 0i  S.
Otherwise we assume that 9(t; S1); (t; S2); : : : ; (t; Sm)2  and S 01 S1; S 02 S2; : : : ; S 0t 
St (\=" cannot be held by all) such that
mS
i=1
[S 0i ]t =

mS
i=1
S 0i

t
(17)
and 
t;
mS
i=1
S 0i

=2  and (8(t; S)2 )
mS
i=1
S 0i 6 S: (18)
From (t; Si)2  we can get (t; Si)2 , i.e., [Si]t  0. Note that S 0i  Si implies [S 0i ]t 
[Si]t , so [S 0i ]t  0, and hence
mS
i=1
[S 0i ]t  0: (19)
Combination of Eqs. (17) and (19) gets

mS
i=1
S 0i

t
 0;
so by Eq. (9)

t;
mS
i=1
S 0i

2 : (20)
But (t;
Sm
i=1 S
0
i ) =2  in Eq. (18). If = , it is a contradiction to Eq. (20). If  , then
from Lemma 4.3 we can decide that (9(t; S)2 )Smi=1 S 0i  S, which is a contradiction
to Eq. (18).
From (1) to (4), it can be inferred that  is a threshold closure, i.e., (9)= .
Second, we prove that  0  .
(1) Because =  , (8(t; S)2 ) (t; S)2 , so [S]t  0 by Eq. (9).
This explains
S
(t; S)2 [S]t  0 in accordance with Corollary 4.1.
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(2) It is not dicult to get
(8S 2 0)[S]jSj= fSg 0; (21)
so by Eq. (9) (jSj; S)2 .
Then there exists (jSj; S 0)2  with S  S 0 and there does not exist (jSj; S 00)2  such
that S 0 S 00, so by Eq. (10)
(jSj; S 0)2 = : (22)
Further, S  S 0 implies [S]jSj[S 0]jSj. So from S 2fSg= [S]jSj, we can conclude that
S 2 [S 0]jSj: (23)
By Eqs. (21){(23),  0
S
(t; S)2 [S]t is derived easily in accordance with Corol-
lary 4.2.
Summarizing (1) and (2) above, we get  0 =
S
(t; S)2 [S]t , and hence  0   by
Denition 4.2.
Third, if there exist two threshold closures 1 and 2 such that  0  1 and  0  2,
i.e.,
S
(t; S)21
[S]t = 0 and
S
(t; S)22
[S]t = 0;
then
S
(t; S)21
[S]t =
S
(t; S)22
[S]t :
From Theorem 4.1 we can get
1 = 2;
which proves the uniqueness.
Theorem 4.3. Given a threshold closure ; there is one and only one basis access
structure  0 consistent with it.
Proof. Denote
=
S
(t; S)2
[S]t : (24)
First, we prove that  is a basis access structure, i.e., A =2 , AB^B2 . Otherwise,
we assume  is not a basis access structure, i.e.,
(9S1; S2 2 ) S1 S2:
Because S1 2 , we have fS1g , i.e.,
[S1]jS1j
S
(t; S)2
[S]t ;
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then from Lemma 4.2 we can get
(9(jS1j; S 01)2 ) S1 S 01:
Similarly,
(9(jS2j; S 02)2 ) S2 S 02:
Note that S1 S2 implies jS1j < jS2j and S1 S 02, so S1 S 01 \ S 02 and jS1j6jS 01 \ S 02j,
which is contradictory to the 1st condition of Denition 4.1. So  is a basis access
structure, i.e., (9 0) = 0.
Second, by Denition 4.2 and Eq. (24), it is obvious that   .
Third, if there exist two basis access structures  00 and  
00
0 such that  
0
0   and
 000  , thenS
(t; S)2
[S]t = 00 and
S
(t; S)2
[S]t = 000 ;
so
 00 = 
00
0 ;
which proves the uniqueness.
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 tell us that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between  0
and , and this correspondence is achieved through Denition 4.2 { \consistency". Since
there exists a unique threshold closure  as the representation of an access structure
 0, the next problem is raised: how to convert  0 into ?
4.3. Converting  0 into 
With some basic combinatorics knowledge, we can see the conversion process runs
on the time complexity C=O(2j 0j). Generally j 0j is much larger than w. If j 0j
approaches 2w (w= jPj), then the time complexity C will be almost O(22w).
By means of combinatorial optimization, the time complexity can be cut down dra-
matically, however. In the following conversion algorithm, the time complexity C does
not exceed O(2w). When  0 is approaching 2w, C is even polynomial to j 0j.
First, we give four notations as
A  B= fA[B : A2A; B2Bg; A; AB 2P; (25)
kt;Sk = f(t; S) : S 2Sg; S 2P; (26)
 (t)0 = fS 2 0 : jSj= tg; (27)
(t) = fS : (t; S)2 g: (28)
Clearly  (t)0 is still an access structure, and kt; (t)k is still a threshold closure.
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Next, by Denition 4.1, Eqs. (27) and (28), we can get four lemmas and one
theorem.
Lemma 4.4.  0 =
S
t 
(t)
0 ;  
(i)
0 \ (j)0 = ;; i 6= j.
Lemma 4.5. =
S
tkt; (t)k; (i) \  (j) = ;; i 6= j.
Lemma 4.6.
S
(t; S)2kt; (t)k [S]t =
S
S2(t) [S]t ; for a xed t.
Lemma 4.7.
S
t
S
S2(t) [S]t =
S
(t; S)2 [S]t .
Theorem 4.4.  0  iff (8t)  (t)0 kt; (t)k.
Proof. If  (t)0  kt; (t)k, thenS
(t; S)2kt;  (t)k
[S]t = 
(t)
0 : (29)
If for every possible t, Eq. (29) is held, then
S
t
S
(t; S)2kt; (t)k
[S]t =
S
t
 (t)0 : (30)
By Lemmas 4.4, 4.6 and 4.7, Eq. (30) becomes
S
(t; S)2
[S]t = 0; (31)
which proves that  0 .
On the other hand, if  0  then Eqs. (31) and (30) are tenable in succession. From
Lemmas 4.4{4.6, we can decide that for every possible t, Eq. (29) is also held, which
means that  (t)0 kt; (t)k by Denition 4.2.
Theorem 4.4 tells us that we can convert  0 into  by converting every  
(t)
0 into 
(t)
correspondingly.
Denition 4.3. A t-cluster, denoted as (t), is a superset of P with the properties
(1)  (t)0 (t);
(2) For S 2(t) and x2PnS, if [S]jSj−1  ffxgg(t), then S [fxg2(t).
From Denition 4.3 we can see that (t) actually is a subset of a matroid [20, 9]
which is an important combinatorial optimization technique. In this way, we restrict
the space and hence the time for searching  to be as small as possible.
Notation 4.2. O(t) is the collection of the maximum sets in (t); i:e:;
O(t) = fS 2(t) : ( 6 9 S 0 2(t)) S  S 0g:
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(t)  ;;
For each S 2
 (t)0 do
Addin(t; S);
Endfor
Return;
Fig. 1. Converting  (t)0 into 
(t).
By Denitions 4.3, 4.1 and Notation 4.2, kt; O(t)k is a threshold closure. Moreover,
according to the construction method of (t), it is obvious that  (t)0  kt; O(t)k. Because
of the uniqueness of the consistency, O(t) is denitely (t).
Based on the concept of t-cluster (t), we can come up with an algorithm to generate
(t) from  (t)0 . The algorithm is described in Figs. 1 and 2, where Q is a queue of the
subsets of P.
4.4. Conversion eciency
From the conversion algorithm we can see that the algorithm is a process of touring
those relevant sets that contain the sets in  0. There are totally 2w sets in 2P (w=P)
and  0 2P, so the time complexity C will not exceed O(2w). For the case when
 0 = 
(t)
0 = [P]t and t=w=2, the time complexity C will not exceed
1
8  w3=2  22w.
Clearly in this case,
j 0j =

w
t

:=
r
2
 
2wp
w
:
So represented by j 0j and w, C will not exceed 14 w5=2  j 0j2, which indicates that C
is polynomial to j 0j when j 0j approaches 2w.
After implementing the algorithm of converting  0 into , we are able to measure
its eciency in practice. We rst randomly generate a basis access structure, then
test the conversion eciency of this algorithm on Digital AlphaServer 4100. We use
the statistical data in Tables 1{4 to demonstrate the eciency, where T denotes the
seconds used to convert  0 into .
From these tables we can observe that jj is generally less than half of j 0j (some
are even less) and the conversion time T is small enough to satisfy the require-
ment of application systems. So we acquire an eective and ecient conversion
algorithm.
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T  SS02(t) S 0;
If S = T then
Add S into (t);
Else
Q  ;;
Append S at the end of Q;
While Q 6= ; do
Fetch the rst S from Q;
AddQ  FALSE;
For each x 2 T − S do
If (8S1 2 ([S]jSj−1  ffxgg)) (9S2 2 (t)) S1 S2 then
Append S [ fxg at Q;
AddQ  TRUE;
Endif
Endfor
If AddQ = FALSE then
Delete all S 0 from (t) with S 0 S;
Add S into (t);
Endif
Endwhile
Endif
Return;
Fig. 2. Algorithm of Addin(t; S).
Table 1
The Eciency when w=10; t=2
j 0j 20 25 30 35 40
jj 11 10 9 8 3
T 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.016666 0.033332
Table 2
The Eciency when w=10; t=3
j 0j 60 75 90 105 120
jj 31 31 37 27 1
T 0.016666 0.033332 0.049998 0.116662 0.299988
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Table 3
The Eciency when w=20; t=2
j 0j 100 120 140 160 180
jj 53 66 58 60 48
T 0.233324 0.699972 2.683226 16.69933 69.36665
Table 4
The Eciency when w=20; t=3
j 0j 500 625 750 875 1,000
jj 278 355 454 532 749
T 2.383238 4.433156 9.849606 27.53223 105.3791
4.5. Operations on  and  0
In a practical secret sharing scheme the access structure is dynamic and is liable to
change at any time. In order to maintain the consistency between  0 and , each time
one is updated the other must also be updated accordingly and properly. There are four
kinds of operations on  and  0. We will discuss them one by one.
In this section we denote
((t1; S1); (t2; S2))=
t2−1S
i=0
kt1; [S1 \ S2]i  [S1 − S2]t1−i k
and
G(S)= fS 0 2 0 : S  S 0g:
4.5.1. Add (t0; S0) into 
Mark  to be the queue of threshold candidates. Originally it contains only (t0; S0).
Start. If  is empty then the addition is completed, so add [S0]t0 into  0 and stop.
Otherwise, if  is non-empty, then pick the next (t0; S0) from , and \lter" (t0; S0)
through Filters 1{5 one by one.
Filter 1: If 9(t; S)2  such that
t6 t0 ^ S0 S;
then the addition of (t0; S0) is invalid, so return back to Start.
Filter 2: For each (t; S)2  such that
t06 t ^ S  S0;
delete (t; S) from .
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Filter 3: If 9(t; S)2  such that
t<t0 ^ (S  S0 _ t6 jS \ S0j<minfjSj; jS0jg);
then put ((t0; S0); (t; S)) into , and return back to Start.
Filter 4: For each (t; S)2  such that
t0<t ^ (S0 S _ t06jS \ S0j<minfjSj; jS0jg);
delete (t; S) from .
Next denote  to be ((t; S); (t0; S0)), and do the following:
(8(t; S 0)2 )(9(t; S 00)2 ) S 0 S 00! delete (t; S 0) from :
Last add  into .
Filter 5: Call the procedure Addin(t0; S0) according to Fig. 2, then return back to
Start.
4.5.2. Add S0 into  0
(1) If (9S 0 2 0) S 0 S0, then the addition is invalid;
(2) Otherwise, delete G(S0) from  0, add S0 into  0, and simultaneously add (jS0j ; S0)
into .
4.5.3. Delete (t0; S0) from 
Just delete (t0; S0) from , and do the following:
(8S 0 2 [S0]t0 )(8(t0; S)2 ) S 0= S! delete S 0 from  0:
4.5.4. Delete S0 from  0
Just delete S0 from  0, and do the following:
(8(jS0j; S)2 ) S0 S
! delete (jS0j; S) from ; and
(8(jS0j; S 0)2 ((jS0j; S); (jS0j; S0)))(8(jS0j; S 00)2 ) S 0= S 00
! add (jS0j; S 0) into :
4.6. Minimization of the threshold closure
Now, we have obtained a threshold closure from a given access structure. Although
the threshold closure is the unique one consistent with the access structure, it cannot be
guaranteed to be the minimal one. Clearly, a threshold closure can be minimal only if
every threshold in the threshold closure cannot be constructed from the other thresholds
in the same threshold closure. However, some threshold closures do not satisfy this
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condition, so they are not minimal. For example, in the threshold closure
= f(2; P1P2P5); (2; P1P3P5); (2; P1P4P6); (2; P2P3P6);
(2; P2P4P7); (2; P3P4P7); (2; P1P2P3P4)g;
the threshold (2; P1P2P3P4) can be constructed from the other six thresholds, and
nf(2; P1P2P3P4)g is the minimal subset of  that realizes the same access structure
as  does. Therefore, for such a nonminimal threshold closure, we can use its minimal
subset to undertake the realization task of the same access structure.
Denition 4.4. A threshold closure  is said to be redundant if there exists a proper
subset of , cov(), such that
S
(t; S)2cov()
[S]t =
S
(t; S)2
[S]t (32)
and cov() is a covering of  if Eq. (32) is held.
Denition 4.5. cov() is said to be a sucient covering of threshold closure  if
(1) cov() is a covering of ;
(2) (8(t; S)2 cov()) (9S1 2 [S]t) (8(t; S 0)2 cov()) S 6= S 0 ^ S1= S 0.
Denition 4.6. min() is said to be a minimal covering of threshold closure  if
(1) min() is a sucient covering of ;
(2) jmin()j is the minimum among all of the sucient coverings of .
Our purpose is to nd a minimal covering to substitute the actual threshold closure
in practice. The algorithm is in Fig. 3 and its time complexity e is O(j 0j  jj2).
The algorithm in Fig. 3 can nd a minimal covering of . First observe that the sets
in (t) is examined according to their sizes, that is, from the smaller set to the bigger
set. It is possible that a bigger set can be constructed from a number of smaller sets,
while these smaller sets can also be constructed from some other sets including the
bigger set. Under such circumstances, to delete these smaller sets is more optimal than
to delete the bigger set, because in the former way, the covering will contain much less
sets. Hence, the sequence of examining the sets in (t) warrants the minimal covering
of the threshold closure.
4.7. Secret sharing upon the threshold closure
From the denition of  and its conversion from  0, we can see that threshold closure
is a structure composed of as few as possible thresholds, thus provides a mechanism
for realizing the underlying access structure. So each time we want to construct a secret
sharing scheme from an access structure  0, we rst convert  0 into , then for each
threshold in the threshold closure , we can implement it with the Shamir threshold
scheme. As analyzed before, this conversion process is ecient and the number of
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For each possible t do
 ;;
	 (t);
While 	 6= ; do
Fetch S from 	 with jSj is the minimum in 	;
If (9S 0 2 (t)0 )(8S 00 2	[) S 0 S ^S 0 * S 00 then
Put S into ;
Endif
Endwhile
(t)  ;
Endfor
Return;
Fig. 3. Minimal covering of :
thresholds in the threshold closure is much smaller than the number of authorized
subsets in the access structure. Therefore, the secret sharing scheme can be eciently
implemented by means of the threshold closure consistent with the access structure.
The dynamic property of an access structure determines its scalability which, in turn,
demands that the threshold closure also be dynamic and scalable in order to maintain
their mutual consistency. Section 4.5 illustrates that the operations on  are ecient
and easy to implement, and its consistency with the access structure is maintained even
if the threshold closure is expanded or contracted. Therefore, the threshold closure
possesses scalability besides its eternal consistency with the access structure.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we introduced a new tool for constructing secret sharing schemes,
called threshold closure. A threshold closure is a minimal collection of thresholds
that suciently realize a given access structure. There exists a one-to-one correspon-
dence between a threshold closure and an access structure, and this \correspondence"
is dened by \consistency". Through the concept of \consistency", we elaborated the
construction of the threshold closure.
By means of combinatorial optimization, we are able to eciently convert an ac-
cess structure into its corresponding threshold closure. In addition, the number of the
thresholds in the destinate threshold closure is very much smaller than the number of
authorized sets in the source access structure. Therefore the conversion algorithm we
devised is eective and ecient.
With the threshold closure on hand, we can construct the corresponding secret shar-
ing scheme eciently. We rst converted the access structure, the essence of a secret
sharing scheme, into its consistent threshold closure, then for each threshold in the
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threshold closure we implemented it with the Shamir threshold scheme. Due to the
simple polynomial interpolation method of the Shamir threshold scheme, such a con-
struction of the secret sharing scheme is very eective and ecient.
The dynamic property of the access structure determines the scalability of the thresh-
old closure. In practice, in order to reect the variation of the secret sharing scheme,
the access structure is dynamic and updated frequently. This situation requests the
threshold closure also be dynamic in order to exactly represent the access structure.
By employing the convenient operations the threshold closure cannot only expand and
contract freely but also preserve its permanent consistency with the dynamic access
structure. We call this property of the threshold closure as scalable, i.e., the threshold
closure possesses scalability.
In a word, as an optimization method in realizing the access structures and im-
plementing the secret sharing schemes, the construction of the threshold closure is a
satisfactory attempt.
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